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TOWARD RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN UKRAINE: INDIGENOUS
CHURCHES AND FOREIGN MISSIONARIES
by Myrosolav Marynovitch
A participant in the proselytism studies conferences sponsored through
Pew Foundation, Myroslav Marynovitch teaches theology in L’viv
Ukraine. He was also a Pew Fellow in the Religious Human Rights
program at Columbia University.
1. Introduction: The Emergence of New Sets of Questions
The notion of religious freedom seemed at first to be very simple and clear for
citizens of the former Soviet Union, including those who lived in Ukraine. This
freedom meant no persecution for practising the religion of their choice, no teachers
standing near churches at Easter and checking for children of their schools who dared
to join the worship, no obligation for practically all the priests to be "voluntary
informants" of the KGB. It was this freedom our people claimed, and it was this
freedom that they received after perestroika (at the beginning of the 1990s) and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, freedom did not come without difficulties. The religious
situation in Ukraine cannot be understood without recognizing one key fact - Stalinist
terror froze the relations between religions and between different Christian
denominations at a time when they were very far from being in balance. Therefore
even the smallest improvement of the political situation inevitably brought a
regrouping of the forces and radical changes in the scale of influence of different
actors. The process is not yet finished.
The general spectrum of religious organizations may be divided into several
blocks:
Orthodox Churches:
- the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in unity with the Moscow Patriarchate
(6,500 parishes);
- two autocephalous, jurisdictionally independent Churches:
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyivan Patriarchate (1,300 parishes)
and
the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1,200 parishes);
- small historical fragments of different Orthodox Churches.
Catholic Churches:

- the Greek Catholic [Uniate) Church (3,033 parishes);1
- the Roman Catholic Church (663 parishes).
Protestant Churches:
- the Union of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (1,400 communities);
- the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith [Pentecostals] (700 com.);
-the Church of Seventh Day Adventists (400 com.);
-the Jehovah's Witnesses (200 com.).
Judaic communities (70).
Muslim communities (120).
Religious communities of Eastern Cults:
- the Society of Krishna's consciousness (23);
- Buddhist communities (22).
The transfer from totalitarianism to religious freedom was too rapid. The
resultant religious pattern was far from that expected by people. First, they soon
realized that they were no longer a religiously homogeneous society - they were
neither only Orthodox in the East of Ukraine nor only Greek Catholic (Uniate) in the
West.2 It proved impossible to return to an idealized classical Ukraine that had later
been suppressed by the tsarist and Communist regimes.3 One could hardly recognize
an ethnographic Ukraine in the new plurality of denominations and religions, as well
as the groups of non-believers and of believers with no church or even no religious
affiliation. Religious freedom revealed the loss of a clear traditional religious identity
of Ukraine. Thus, the first set of questions raised by religious freedom was:
(1) is Ukraine still an Orthodox country? (or, in another modification, is
Western Ukraine still Greek Catholic?)

1

A distinguishing feature of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is that having the Orthodox
rite and ecclesiological structure she is an Eastern church and belongs to the traditional
Orthodox world. At the same time, being subordinated to the Holy See she belongs to the family
of Catholic churches. My article speaks to both aspects. In general, as far as a rite is concerned,
Ukraine is mostly an Orthodox country.
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Till 1939 both parts of the Ukrainian population lived in different states - the Eastern part lived within
the Russian Empire/Soviet Union while the Western part lived within the Austro-Hungarian Empire/
Polish State till 1939. So each part was to some extent homogeneous, the Eastern part seeming to be
Orthodox and the Western part seeming to be Greek-Catholic, with not many Protestants present in
both.
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For a general overview of the movement for the independence of Ukrainian (Kyivan) Orthodoxy from
Moscow, see Serhij Plokhy, “Kyiv vs. Moscow: The Autocephalous Movement in Independent
Ukraine.” The Harriman Review, Vol.9, No. 1-2, Spring 1996, p.32-37.

(2) are Ukrainian Protestants (or Roman Catholics) to be included in the
formula of a future Ukrainian religious identity?
(3) who are the non-believers really: victims of communism and, therefore,
subjects for decommunization or are they independent partners to share the
same freedom of belief?
Secondly, Ukrainians also soon realized that religious freedom provided
different Churches with the same freedom to exist. It was painful sometimes for
particular religious groups to see rival "false" churches enjoying the same freedom as
their "true" church did. This jealousy did not necessarily mean that people questioned
the very principle of equality of opportunity. Often, it was exactly this equality which
people claimed. The essence of the problem was that the inter-denominational pattern
in Ukraine had been maintained in an unbalanced state by the Communist regime.
Some Churches had been favored by the Soviet authorities. One of the last
illustrations of this in fact took place at the end of Communist power when many
former Ukrainian Uniate churches in Western Ukraine, which had been used as
storehouses, were given by the authorities only to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Some of churches had been completely outlawed, for example, the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, some
branches of Soviet Baptists, and Jehovah's Witnesses.
At the beginning of perestroika, the competitive abilities of churches were
therefore quite different. That is why imposing religious freedom without paying
attention to this historical inequality seemed to be a violation of the main democratic
principle - a principle of equality of starting opportunities. The seeming '`equality"
was, in fact, a a status of preference for one church traditionally favored in the
Communist state. No wonder that people immediately opposed that sort of freedom
and democracy. Thus, the second set of questions raised by religious freedom in
Ukraine included:
(1) is the State, which had forcibly diminished competitive abilities of
indigenous churches in the past, now obliged to introduce some
protectionistic measures in the present?

(2) what kind of "odds" should be given to some churches to equalize their
starting opportunities with other churches?
(3) what criteria are to be applied to more fairly recognize those churches in
need?
(4) should churches which are in opposition to Ukrainian independence and
actively advocate a reunion with Russia be tolerated equally with those which
are loyal to Ukrainian independence?

The third problem to solve was an incursion of foreign religious missionaries.
Dr. Philip Walters, Keston College general editor, published some surprising
statistics: "In 1979 there were 80 [Western Christian organizations with an interest in
Central and Eastern Europe]; by 1989 there were 311; and the estimate for 1996 is
942, of which about 515 are concerned with the former USSR. Although a few of
these organizations are Catholic or Orthodox, the majority are evangelical
Protestant".4 In addition, there were numerous non-Christian missions.
The shift from total isolation to an inundation of foreign religious missions
was too hard for Ukrainians to bear patiently. While welcome at the beginning, later
on foreign missionaries began to face opposition from various groups in Ukrainian
society. Many Ukrainian Churches accused them of "sheep-stealing" and tried to
introduce restrictive national legislation of foreign religious organizations. Some
restrictive Amendments to the Ukrainian Freedom of Conscience Law were adopted
by the Ukrainian Supreme Rada (Parliament) in 1993. For instance, preachers of
foreign religious organizations
"may preach religious dogmas, perform religious rites and practice
other canonical activities only in those religious organizations on
whose invitations they came, and upon an official agreement with the
state body which has registered the statute of the corresponding
religious organization”.5
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Howard L. Biddulph. “Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: Nationalism Versus Equal
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The lack of competitive experience and resources of indigenous Churches in
Ukraine in the face of foreign religious missions became obvious. No wonder,
therefore, that religious freedom was often seen as acting in favor of foreign
churches, thereby leaving the indigenous traditions unprotected. Thus, a new set of
questions was raised by the experience of religious freedom:
(1) are foreign missions the only reason for "losing the battle"?
(2) are limitations, imposed on religious freedom of foreign missionaries, the
only way of balancing the competitive abilities of all the religious actors in
Ukraine?
This report cannot answer all these difficult questions. What it can do at least,
is to clarify some of them (mostly the last set of questions) and to trace possible ways
toward their solution.

2. Why Do They Seem to be Losing the Battle?
2.1. Historical Background - Tradition of Being a State Church
During its long history, the Eastern Church in Eastern Slavonic lands always
leaned upon a governmental arm - either that of the King, the Tsar, or the Communist
party. As a result, its internal immunity to the influence of foreign churches was
sufficiently diminished. State authorities had always protected the Church against
religious rivals, or, as in communist times, had largely banned them. The fall of
communism and the removal of these protections against competition caught the
Church unprepared for the competitive rivalry with foreign missionaries.
A millennium-long tradition of a single established (state) Church has formed
a stereotype about the responsibility of the state to protect the Church. That is why all
the Churches of Byzantine rite in the Ukraine blamed (in different ways and with
different arguments) the Ukrainian state for neglecting its duties. This position was
generally supported by the faithful. The historical background, therefore, seems to
have a cultural dimension which cannot be voluntarily changed within a historically
short period of time.

The situation in Ukraine differs from that in, for instance, Russia with its
dominant church strongly subordinated to the state. According to José Casanova.
Ukraine faces
"an incipient religious denominationalism which is closer to the
American model than to the European one. Under such conditions [...]
no particular denomination could possibly become the official
established religion of the new Ukrainian state or, for that matter, the
disestablished but official national religion".6
On the one hand, this, in fact, "may be conductive to the formation of a culturally
pluralistic, religiously tolerant. and democratic Ukraine".7 On the other hand, this
causes speculation about an artificial Americanization of the religious life in Ukraine
which contradicts Ukrainian religious identity and the Eastern nature of the Ukrainian
Church.
What these two competitive trends will result in cannot be foreseen. In any
case, the plurality of religions and denominations, that has emerged after Ukrainian
independence, does preclude a creation of the Kyivan replica of the Russian Church
strongly subordinated to the state. At the same time, one can hardly imagine drawing
a classical American "wall of separation" between church and state in future Ukraine.
What is most likely is some sort of cooperation between church and state, the latter
being neutral with respect to different denominations and, at the same time,
recognizing the particular contribution of the Churches of Byzantine rite into forming
Ukrainian religious and cultural identity. For example, the state may contribute to the
renovation of the church buildings damaged during the communist period or the
restoration of those which had been destroyed completely. Indeed, most of such
buildings are national monuments of great cultural value.
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Jose Casanova, “Incipient Religious Denominationalism in Ukraine and its Effects on
Ukrainian-Russian Relations.” The Harriman Review, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, Spring 1996, p.40.
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See ibid. p.41.

Similarly to the tsarist regime, the Communist one kept out foreign
missionaries during the period of its rule. But Communists isolated the Church in
order to suffocate it rather than to protect it. The institutional network of the Church
was strongly diminished. Its charitable activity -the essence of the social importance
of the Church - was absolutely forbidden. The very notion of "charity" was treated as
a "dirty" word by Communist doctrine. It is clear, therefore, that after the fall of
Communism, the Church had to start, in some sense, from the very beginning. Thus,
the role of the State in artificial weakening the Church is evident.
2.2 Theological Lag
Orthodoxy was also not ready for competition theologically. Protestant
theology, with its key idea of freedom of choice, was the first to sacrifice its feeling
of being the sole repository of truth in favor of religious freedom and, later, of
religious tolerance.8 Roman Catholic theology, with its core idea of legal and
institutional order, was the second to sacrifice the same feeling in favor of human
rights and democracy as an indispensable condition of human dignity and social
order.9 Orthodox theology, with its central task to preserve religious tradition, is in a
more difficult theological possition. Orthodoxy faces two strong modernized forms of
Christianity, yet it is now incapable of making changes (or, at least, of making them
easily) in its ultimate value - tradition. This creates a considerable "developmental
gap" between them, placing strong pressure on Orthodoxy, which is rather archaic, to
modernize. Both Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries, therefore, appear to
have more competitive capacity in comparison with indigenous Orthodoxy. No
wonder that isolationist tendencies prevail in Orthodoxy.
2.3. Problems of the Clergy
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John Witte, Jr., “Introduction.” in John Witte, Jr. ed. Christianity and Democracy in Global Context .
Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 5.
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Charles E. Curran. “Religious-Freedom and Human Rights in the World and the Church: a Christian
Perspective." in Leonard Swidler, ed. Religious Liberty and Human Rights in Nations and in
Religions. Philadelphia: Ecumenical Press, 1986, p.150-151

The 72 years of the communist experiment caused a major devastation among
the clergy in Ukraine. Priests at all hierarchical levels had been carefully selected
according to their loyalty to the communist regime and their readiness to obey the
commands of the authorities. Communist authorities used to tolerate neither warning
bishops nor even truthful "king's fools". The fall of Communism found the clergy too
weakened to represent a valuable spiritual to alternative to the communist ideologists
or even to restore the suppressed functions of the Church adequately. The old clergy,
were sometimes unable and unwilling to adapt to new situations and challenges. The
newly appointed clergy of the 1990s could not change the situation immediatelv.
Moreover, a considerable part of the new clergy bears the same "birth-marks" of
communism with its moral relativity and intolerance: as the famous Soviet proverb
said, "all of us were born in October" -- meaning the October revolution. Sometimes,
the clergy were ruled by what was "good for one's church" rather than by absolute
moral imperatives.
Both the faithful within the churches and their religious rivals have been
aware of this weakened state of the clergy. The low intellectual and spiritual level of
the Orthodox/Greek Catholic clergy is often unattractive for modern Ukrainian
intellectuals, especially young ones, who sometimes find the Roman Catholic or
Protestant clergy more responsive to their needs. The compromised attitude of the
Orthodox clergy towards the communist regime in the past is sometimes used by
Protestant missionaries as an argument for the inherent defect of Orthodoxy in
general. Some of the sins of the priests became arguments for Jehovah's Witnesses to
question the necessity of the clergy at all. No wonder, therefore, that the clergy, either
consciously or subconsciously, are afraid of the "open market" of religions and seek
temporary protection to restore their competitive abilities.
In light of such a clergy reluctance, it is important to distinguish between
genuine concerns about objective losses, caused by the communist regime, and the
natural human aspiration to create around themselves an unchallenged and
non-competitive environment. The first needs to be respected and, perhaps supported
by some sort of affirmative action. The second should be disputed or even ignored,
first of all, in favor of the genuine interests of the Church herself. What Ukrainian

society should be concerned about is restoring the competitive abilities of indigenous
Churches, not creating a protective `hothouse" which would only diminish their
inherent immunity from outside influence.
There is a further cause for worry. Over the long historv of its statelessness,10
Ukrainian society always had an incomplete social stratification. The noble and
intellectual elite, primarily of Ukrainian origin, often had assumed other ethnic and
cultural identities. As a result, it was the clergy alone who stayed with ordinary
people in their joys and troubles. In the 19th century Polish state, for instance,
Ukrainian society had been described as a society of "peasants and priests".11 A
Ukrainian priest used to be the highest authority not only in religious matters but also
in political, cultural or even economic questions. This high status of a priest is still
alive in the memory of some clergy and elderly parishioners, and according to them is
valued as a model relationship which should be restored (at least, as much as
possible) in post-communist Ukraine. Needless to say, neither this social stratification
remains the same any longer nor are the clergy professionally ready for the role of
universal authority. Attempts to play an inadequate role in modern Ukrainian society
may therefore cause new problems for the clergy, especially in their relations with the
youth attracted by other and more up-todate religious leaders, and because of the new
reluctance towards religion in general.
2. 4. Financial Difficulties
Practically all the indigenous Churches in Ukraine are in a critical financial
position. The social demand for new church buildings is still high, many existing
churches are overcrowded, and interdenominational tensions left some religious
communities without buildings for worship at all. The Church needs money for its
charitable tasks, which cannot be sufficiently raised from local Ukrainian parishioners
who are suffering the grave consequences of a serious economic crisis in Ukraine.
Restoring all the functions of the Church has often meant to literally rebuild the
10

Kyivan Rus and its fragments finally lost independence in the 14th century. Independence was
recovered by the Ukrainians for short periods of time in 1654 and 1918.
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Rev. George Fedoriv. Istoriya Tserkvy v Ukraini (The history of the Church in Ukraine). London:
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Church: new monasteries, seminaries, parish houses are being erected now. Church
media and publishing houses need money too. The list of requirements can certainly
be continued, to say nothing about the Church's patronage of art and culture, now
absolutely forgotten. I can only mention some residual intolerance of the State
towards religion when it equates the Church with other profitable organizations, that
results in very high taxation.
This is the background against which foreign missionary activity takes place.
As a rule, foreign religious missions are rich enough to buy the prime time on TV, to
rent the best halls or even stadiums for collective prayer, to organize tours to the
Western countries for Ukrainian artistic bodies, etc. Of course, many of these are
being done for the good purpose of spreading Christian values in the land devastated
by communism. But a distinctive feature of Protestant theology itself is not to forget
about the sinful nature of people (including missionaries, of course). Sometimes the
task of converting becomes more important than that of evangelizing. The
competition between different Western missionaries for "spheres of influence"
becomes more relevant than the interests of indigenous people. Sometimes charitable
and educational activity reveals a certain proselytizing dimension. Ukrainian society
does know many examples of pure evangelism by foreign missionaries.
Unfortunately, it has experienced some negative sides of missionary activity as well. I
am not ready to propose action by legal means to avoid these negative impacts in the
future, but what I am sure of is that the protests of indigenous Churches cannot be
absolutely neglected in favor of the "'free market" model expounded blindly and
theoretically.
2.5. Developmental Gap
The model of a free market of religions envisages that those who lose simply
accept defeat. It is a normal evolutionary principle when we speak about disputes
between progressive and conservative parts of the same Church. It is not a less
acceptable principle when different religious actors of more or less equal competitive
abilities are considered. Application of this principle, however, is more difficult when
either churches of considerably unequal competitive capacities or inherently noncompetitive religions are under concern. It is not the competition of religious ideas

only which we face in the free market of religions. Some developmental issues, such
as modern information technologies, computerization, and the Internet, are implicitly
present in this market as well. It is sometimes very difficult to determine which
impact is more effective! So, a free market of religions cannot be considered as an
absolute value, nor is it a synonym to religious freedom which is to be protected
unconditionally.
To be honest, we have to make up our minds on one more question. Are the
indigenous Churches in Ukraine completely loosing the battle? Are foreign
missionaries so strong (and the indigenous Churches so weak) that a complete
transformation of Ukrainian Christianity is possible? The answer is - definitely not.
Culture, history, national traditions and family and community habits which are
imprinted in childhood - all these stand in favor of indigenous Churches. So we may
speak about a battle for non-believers, for people beyond any Church affiliation, for
"prodigal sons" coming back from their godless roads. Of course, there are a lot of
them after the darkness of Soviet "militant atheism". The loss of these potential
parishioners is very painful to the indigenous Churches, especially when taking into
account that their starting opportunities were unfairly diminished in comparison with
foreign Churches. That is,however, not equal to a loss to the church in general.
In summary, we can list at least the following reasons for the indigenous
Churches to "lose the battle" partially:
( I ) superfluous dependence of the Church on protective walls drawn up by the State;
(2) considerable damage caused by the communist regime, including those in the
charitable, ecclesiastic, and theological fields;
3) lack of an Orthodox theological response to the challenge of democracy and
human rights;
(4) a problem of modernizing a Church which values Tradition;
(5) the low level of theological, spiritual, cultural, and psychological education of the
clergy;
(6) financial difficulties of the Church and the high level of taxation;
(7) the "developmental gap" between the Western countries and the post-Soviet states
in technology and social welfare.

3. Are Limitations, Imposed on the Religious Freedom of Foreign Missionaries,
the Only Way of Balancing the Competitive Abilities of All the Religious Actors
in Ukraine?
Let us begin by analyzing the reasons I have just listed. The Amendments by
the Ukrainian Parliament to the Freedom of Conscience Law, mentioned in the
Introduction, relate directly to only the first reason on the list, namely a superfluous
dependence of the Church on the protective walls drawn up by the State. The are no
official statistics about the results of these Amendments, nor could I find in the
American mass media any cases of serious obstacles for foreign missionaries to enter
Ukraine. My personal observations confirm that those extravagant religious preachers
in the streets which had shocked the Ukrainian public in provincial cities so much at
the beginning of the 1990s were there no more.
Those Amendments were criticized by Western analysts who stated that "the
1993 Amendments effectively reduce the religious liberties originally provided under
the Ukrainian Freedom of Conscience Law".12 The lack of concrete cases of human
rights violations under those Amendments, of course, does not mean that the latter are
not fraught with serious risk of violations in the future. Whatever the original logic,
the

Amendments

exemplify

attempts

to

balance

interdenominational

and

interreligious relations at the expense of religious freedom.
The arguments listed above show that to impose limitations on the religious
freedom of foreign missionaries is not the only way of balancing the competitive
abilities of all the religious actors in Ukraine. To draw up barriers is alwavs easier
than to render positive support. In other words, to meet the challenges mentioned in
points 2 and 6 above - that is, to compensate for damages caused by the communist
regime and to recognize the charitable nature of the Church by more flexible taxation,
at least - the State needs money, a lot of money. It is clear. that the State cannot afford
this during its current severe economic crisis. At the same time, there is no clear
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official statement that the State recognizes its moral and financial obligations and is
ready to discharge them at the first opportunity.
The support of the State may be invaluable for the educational programs of
the indigenous Churches (point 5). The Churches can benefit from the state
educational network to the extent permissible by the secular nature of the State and by
the canonical rules of the Church. What is absolutely indispensable here is a
denominational neutrality of the State. Every church (or religion), persecuted in
Soviet times, should take advantage of such support. The manner and amount of such
support, by compiling a list of recipients, might be estimated by a specially
established advisory Council consisting of representatives of both the state and the
different churches.
Cooperation between the State and the Church in restoring the potential of the
latter should not be understood in terms of limitation of the religious freedoms of
foreign missionaries. All religious actors in Ukraine have to obtain the same freedom
of speech, press and assembly. The temporary protectionism of the State could be
allowed only in supporting indigenous churches through compensation for the
damaging interference of the State into the Church affairs in the past.
It is clear, that the “developmental gap" (point 7) cannot be closed by the
efforts of the Ukrainian government and churches alone. Much depends on the
position of the world missions. Let the ambivalent experience of the new direct
contact between the West and the post-communist East be a lesson not only to the
Eastern Churches of the region but to the Western missions as well. If it is the good
news that is to be brought to Eastern Europe, let it be free of denominational
chauvinism and of taking advantage of temporary crisis in this part of the world. The
ancient Christian tradition of Eastern Slavonic lands is worthy of recognition and
should be respected by Christian missions at least. If proselytizing is a main goal of
missionaries then they are considerably pre-desposed to be antagonized. On the
contrary, the good-will partnership in mutual witness of the Christian faith would
make the relations stable and trustful.

Finally, the theological and educational animation of the Church, the problem of
modernizing it (points 3, 4 and 5) are directly within the competence of the indigenous
Churches. It is a rather dangerous illusion that the isolation of the Church may contribute
to the restoration of her suppressed abilities. There is a very creative point of view from
which the absence of religious unity and the "invasion" of foreign missions may be
considered as a blessing of God. The missionary activity has to be considered by the
Churches in Ukraine as stimulating a strong drive to find and to develop their own
inherent potential to survive and compete. The only productive way of protecting the
Church is to help her meet the challenges of the modern world, above all, by theological
and ecclesiastical means. Religious freedom (either outside or inside the Church) can
serve this aim fruitfully by widening the field of alternatives in theological pursuits. Once
the potential is recovered, religious freedom will no longer seem dangerous.

